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For the Practitioner 
BLUER SKIES IN MARYLAND: 
An Introduction To The New Maryland Exemptions For Limited And 
Private Offerings of Securities 
Introduction: 
The Unpleasant Surprise 
The general business practitioner is 
often surprised to learn of the need to 
comply with the securities laws. The sur-
prise is often an unpleasant one, since it 
usually arrives after a deal has fallen apart 
and the investors have filed suit on the 
basis of the registration or antifraud pro-
visions of the federal and state securities 
laws. That surprise may even become a 
shock, if the practitioner learns that some 
agency has invoked the criminal provi-
sions of those acts against his client or 
even against him.' The practitioner can 
avoid such surprises by remembering that 
some aspects of the state and federal 
schemes of securities regulation are ap-
plicable in varying degrees to all securi-
ties transactions, and that these schemes 
have supplanted the ancient maxim of 
caveat emptor with its opposite-caveat 
venditor. 
Remembering that security regulation 
may apply is especially important when 
common sense suggests that the trans-
action has nothing to do with the secu-
rities laws. Common sense, for example, 
might suggest that the securities laws 
would not apply to a routine issuance of 
stock in a closely-held, "mom and pop" 
corporation. In this case, common sense 
would be wrong. The antifraud provisions 
of the securities laws apply to all secu-
rities transactions, including this one,2 and 
mom and pop have the burden of proving 
an exemption for this transaction from the 
registration requirements. 3 That burden 
may not be difficult to carry, but it remains 
the responsibility of the persons selling 
the securities, even if those persons are 
mom and pop. Similarly, common sense 
might suggest that the sale of condomi-
niums, yachts, chinchillas, and orange 
groves has nothing to do with the secu-
rities laws. Common sense might be wrong 
in these cases, too, since the sale of these 
commodities may be transformed into the 
sale of "investment contracts" by the 
manner in which they are sold.4 Since 
"investment contracts" are securities,S the 
transaction would be subject to both the 
registration and antifraud provisions. 
The practitioner should also remember 
that he has not exhausted his responsi-
bilities by complying with the federal se-
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curities laws. Every state, including Mary-
land, has its own securities act, or "blue 
sky" law, and each state's act applies to 
every securities transaction within the 
state's borders. The practitioner must en-
sure compliance with the securities laws 
of every state in which the client offers or 
sells securities. This task is not simple: 
the state securities laws are not mirror 
images of either the federal securities laws 
or each other, and the state securities 
administrators are famous for their in-
genious exercise of discretion. 
Once the practitioner has alerted him-
self to the applicability of the securities 
laws, he needs to think about which as-
pects of those laws apply to the trans-
action in question. He can start with one 
simple premise: the antifraud provisions 
apply to all securities transactions, re-
gardless of whether the securities are 
regis~"lred or exempt. In short, there are 
no exemptions from the antifraud provi-
sions; the securities must be offered and 
sold without misrepresentation or omis-
sion of material fact. s The practitioner then 
has to think about whether the persons 
marketing the securities have complied 
with the broker-dealer and agent regis-
tration requirements, or whether they are 
somehow exempted from compliance with 
those requirements. Finally, the prac-
tioner has to determine whether the 
transaction can be exempted from the se-
curities registration requirements. This is 
often the crucial determination, since the 
costs of registration can be great, and a 
security must be either registered or ex-
empted before it can be offered to any-
one. The offer or sale of an unregistered, 
unexempted security is a plain and simple 
violation of both federal and state law for 
which the offender will be held strictly li-
able. . 
This article will not try to summarize the 
vast range of issues surrounding secu-
rities law compliance. It will merely try to 
explain the one aspect of the Maryland 
securities laws that the general business 
practitioner is likely to encounter on a rou-
tine basis-the transactional exemptions 
for limited and private offerings of secu-
rities. This explanation should be timely, 
because two rules recently promulgated 
by the Maryland Division of Securities (the 
Division) have altered the ways in which 
these exemptions can be used and have 
done so against the backdrop of dramatic 
change in the federal exemptive provi-
sions.? These new rules represent the 
culmination of a long-term, intensive ef-
fort by the Division to foster capital for-
mation by Maryland business (especially 
small business), while continuing to meet 
its obligation to protect Maryland inves-
tors. 
Federal Exemptions and 
Maryland Exemptions: The 
Problem of Coordination 
Before turning to the new Maryland ex-
emptive rules, let's recall a key 
premise: compliance with federal law must 
be coordinated with state law compli-
ance. This coordination can take one of 
several forms. For example, a security 
registered at the federal level may also 
be registered in Maryland through· "reg-
istration by coordination."8 Similarly, some 
transactions exempted at the federal level 
may also be exempted from registration 
in Maryland. We will see how the new 
Maryland rules, in particular, enable such 
pairing of federal and state exemptions. 
On the other hand, a federally exempted 
transaction may end up registered in 
Maryland through the "registration by 
qualification" procedure.9 A transaction 
exempted from federal registration be-
cause of its intra-state character,lO for ex-
ample, may have to be registered by 
qualification, unless an appropriate state 
exemption can be found. Conversely, 
some federally registered securities may 
be exempt in Maryland. Any security of-
fered by issuers listed on the New York, 
American or Philadelphia Exchanges, for 
instance, will be automatically exempt in 
Maryland, even if it is registered at the 
federal level. 11 
Let's assume that an issuer desiring to 
offer and sell securities in Maryland has 
a federal exemption. Let's also assume 
that the exemption depends on the man-
ner in which the security is being offered 
and sold. In other words, the issuer has 
a federal transactional exemption. That 
transactional exemption, furthermore, 
would probably be derived from § 3(b) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 
which exempts offerings limited in size, 
or § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, which exempts 
offerings private in character. 12 
The issuer offering securities in Mary-
land, and using one or both of these fed-
eral exemptions, has a major threshold 
decision. It can, of course, choose to reg-
ister the securities in Maryland. This might 
be a wise decision. The costs of Maryland 
registration are not enormous, and state 
registration may facilitate resale. Fur-
thermore, the Division ordinarily reviews 
the registration statement only for ade-
quacy of disclosure, not for the substan-
tive "fairness" or merits of the offering. 
Alternatively, the issuer may look to §§ 11-
602(9) and (15) of the Maryland Securi-
ties Act. 13 Section 11-602(9), which sets 
out the Maryland limited offering exemp-
tion, was amended in 1981 to reflect the 
most important modern trends in exemp-
tion of limited offerings. Section 11-602( 15) 
was enacted in 1981 to provide a statu-
tory framework for coordination of federal 
and state exemptions. These 1981 stat-
utory changes marked the first step in the 
Division's attempt to make Maryland's se-
curities laws more responsive to the needs 
of Maryland business. 
The new Maryland exemptive rules 
promulgated under §§ 11-602(9) and (15) 
mark the second step in this effort. The 
drafters of these rules were especially 
concerned with increasing the issuer's 
ability to coordinate these major federal 
and state exemptions. In other words, the 
drafters tried to define an exemptive 
scheme which would function systemat-
ically with the federal exemptive scheme. 
In so doing, the drafters gave effect to a 
policy expressed by the drafters of the 
Maryland Securities Act, 14 reflected in ad-
ministrative practice and in Rule S-715 (the 
predecessor to these new exemptions) 
and made specific in § 11-602(15). 
This policy of encouraging systematic 
coordination of federal and state securi-
ties regulation has more than one pur-
pose. First, it reflects a conviction about 
the proper allocation of regulatory re-
sponsibilities in a federal system. Sec-
ond, it reflects a desire to promote the 
efficient operation of the securities mar-
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kets. The new Maryland rules respond to 
both of these concerns, but they also re-
spond to another major concern-the 
need to encourage capital formation by 
small business. The following explana-
tion will suggest several ways in which 
the new rules can assist small businesses 
in their capital raising efforts. 
The Key To The System: 
Maryland Regulation 15 and 
"Exemption by Coordination" 
As mentioned above, the 1933 Act pro-
vides two crucial exemptions from reg-
istration for limited and private offerings. 
Section 3(b) is a deferral to the rule-mak-
ing power of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the SEC); it permits that 
agency to define by rule classes of trans-
actions for which registration is not nec-
essary because of the "small amount" of 
securities being offered or the "limited 
character" of the offering. Section 3(b)'s 
only limit on the SEC's discretion is a 
$5,000,000 cap on the aggregate offering 
price of the securities so exempted. The 
SEC has not hesitated to use its authority 
under this section, promulgating impor-
tant exemptive provisions such as Reg-
ulation A,16 which is still in effect, and 
Rules 240 and 242, both of which have 
been rescinded and replaced by Rules 
504 and 505 of Regulation D.1? 
Section 4(2) exempts "transactions by 
an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing." In other words, § 4(2) exempts pri-
vate offerings, or so-called "private place-
ments." The exemption depends on the 
private character of the offering rather than 
its size, although the privacy requirement 
has traditionally tended to limit the num-
ber of participating investors, if not the 
aggregate offering price. The § 4(2) ex-
emption also differs from the § 3(b) ex-
emption in that it does not depend upon 
the SEC's rule-making power. That is, a 
"statutory" § 4(2) exemption exists apart 
from the rules which the SEC has adopted 
for the purpose of defining when an of-
fering is public or private in character. The 
rules promulgated by the SEC under § 4(2) 
thus function only as "safe harbors." If 
the issuer complies with the specific con-
ditions of the rule, it has a § 4(2) exemp-
tion; if it fails to do so, it may still "stum-
ble" into a statutory exemption by relying 
on the case law and administrative utter-
ances which have clustered around § 4(2) 
over the years.18 The SEC's first § 4(2) 
rule was Rule 146, now rescinded and 
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replaced by Rule 506 of Regulation D. 
Regulation 0 represents a significant 
reform of the SEC's exemptive rules. While 
Regulation 0 is not necessarily simpler 
than its predecessor rules, and while it 
may not be of great help to very small 
businesses,19 it is a great improvement 
over its predecessors. Since the provi-
sions of Regulation 0 have been sum-
marized recently elsewhere,20 and since 
the focus of this article is the new Mary-
land rules, only a few key points about 
Regulation 0 need to be mentioned. 
Regulation 0 consists of six separate 
but interrelated rules. Rules 504-506 state 
three distinct exemptions, two under § 3(b) 
(Rules 504 and 505), and one under § 4(2) 
(Rule 506). Rules 501-503 define terms 
and conditions applicable to all three ex-
emptions. This in itself represents an im-
provement, because Rules 240, 242 and 
146, which were adopted at different times 
and for different purposes, did not con-
stitute a coherent, consistent system. The 
systematic qualities of Regulation 0 are 
not limited to the common set of defini-
tions and conditions in Rules 501-503, 
but are also expressed in the relations 
among Rules 504-506. 
To be precise: the three exemptions 
impose regulatory restraints in proportion 
to the amount of capital which can be 
raised. Rule 504, for example, permits the 
issuer to sell to an unlimited number of 
purchasers, during a twelve-month pe-
riod, securities with an aggregate offering 
price of $500,000. These purchasers need 
not meet "suitability" standards with re-
spect to their investment sophistication or 
economic risk-bearing ability. Further-
more, the exemption does not depend 
upon the securities being offered and sold 
through the use of a specific disclosure 
document, and the issuer is permitted to 
pay commissions to persons aiding the 
sales effort. The major conditions of the 
exemption are the relatively low dollar 
ceiling and a requirement that notice of 
sales be filed with the SEC. 
Rule 505 raises the limit on the aggre-
gate offering price to $5,000,000 in a 
twelve-month period, and proportionately 
increases the regulatory restraints. For 
example, Rule 505 securities may be sold 
to an unlimited number of accredited 
investors, but to only thirty-five non-ac-
credited investors. Accredited investors 
are persons who meet certain objective 
standards of suitability. "Accredited 
Investor" is defined in Rule 501 (a) to in-
clude certain institutional investors, cer-
tain persons related to the issuer, per-
sons purchasing a stated large amount 
of securities, and persons meeting stated 
net worth or annual income criteria. Since 
accredited investors are deemed to be 
suitable, the issuer may sell to an unlim-
ited number of them. Since the non-ac-
credited investors, by definition, do not 
meet Rule 501 (a)'s objective suitability 
criteria, and since Rule 505 does not re-
quire the issuer to make individual, sub-
jective judgments about their suitability, 
the issuer may sell to only thirty-five of 
them. 
If the issuer sells to one non-accredited 
investor, it must furnish a detailed disclo-
sure document to every investor, both ac-
credited and non-accredited, as a con-
dition of the exemption. These conditions 
are supplemented by a prohibition on 
general solicitation and advertising, a no-
tice filing requirement, and a denial of the 
exemption to issuers which have them-
selves or through associated persons been 
subject to specified judicial and admin-
istrative actions. 
Rule 506 reflects the same kind of bal-
ancing. It places no cap on the aggregate 
offering price and no restriction on the 
types of issuers that can use the exemp-
tion. In addition, the issuer may sell to an 
unlimited number of accredited investors 
as well as to thirty-five non-accredited 
investors. The issuer must be satisfied, 
however, that each of those thirty-five non-
accredited investors meet certain gen-
erally specified standards of investment 
sophistication. In addition, the sale to one 
non-accredited investor triggers an obli-
gation to deliver a detailed disclosure 
document. If the aggregate offering price 
exceeds $5,000,000 the issuer must de-
liver a more detailed disclosure document 
than that required by Rule 505. These 
conditions peculiar to Rule 506 are joined 
by the restrictions on general solicitation 
and advertising and by the notice filing 
requirement. 
One of the new Maryland rules was 
specifically designed to exploit these re-
forms in federal law. Division of Securities 
Regulation 15, subsection 8(1 )21 pro-
vides an exemption for an offer or sale 
which "is part of an offering which is made 
in compliance with Rule 505 or 506 ... 
as such rules may be amended from time 
to time." In short, a transaction which 
complies with Rules 505 or 506 will be 
eligible for exemption in Maryland, if it 
meets the three simple conditions to this 
exemption. 
First, subsection 8(2) requires the is-
suer to file with the Division a manually 
signed copy of the form filed with the SEC 
in connection with the Regulation 0 of-
fering (SEC Form D). This copy must be 
filed within fifteen days after the first sale 
of securities under Regulation 15. 
Second, subsection 8(3) provides that 
the issuer may pay sales remuneration 
only to "a broker-dealer which the issuer 
reasonably believes is registered" in 
Maryland, or: 
[aJ natural person who the issuer 
reasonably believes has not re-
ceived a commission or similar re-
muneration for effecting any sale of 
securities on behalf of more than one 
other issuer within a 12-month period 
immediately preceding the first sale 
by that person in the offering made 
in reliance on this exemption. 
In other words, commissions or other re-
muneration may be paid only to a person 
subject to licensing and regulation by the 
Division, or to a person who is not en-
gaged in the business of selling securi-
ties, but merely acts, on an occasional 
basis, as an issuer's agent for the sale of 
securities. This latter limitation reflects the 
Division's long-standing position that a 
person who represents more than two is-
suers in any twelve-month period is "en-
gaged in the business of effecting trans-
actions in securities for the account of 
others," and as such is a "broker-dealer" 
under the Maryland Securities Act,22 An 
issuer seeking the benefit of Regulation 
15 should not be able to remunerate a 
person who is selling securities in viola-
tion of the Act as an unregistered broker-
dealer.23 
Third, subsection 8(4) denies the ex-
emption if the issuer, any of its directors, 
officers, general partners, beneficial own-
ers of ten percent or more of any class 
of the issuer's equity securities, pro-
moters currently connected with the is-
suer in any capacity, or non-registered 
recipients of remuneration for sales ef-
forts has been subject to specified judicial 
or administrative actions within five years 
prior to the first sale of securities under 
this regulation. All of the specified actions 
concern discipline for acts of a fraudulent 
or deceitful nature. Note that these so-
called "bad boy" disqualifications are ad-
ditional to those already imposed on Rule 
505 transactions by Rule 505(b)(2)(iii). 
Regulation 15, therefore, permits a 
substantial degree of exemption by co-
ordination. It represents a positive effort 
by the Division to use its authority under 
§ 11-602(15) of the Maryland Securities 
Act to adopt rules coordinating state ex-
emptions with federal exemptions under 
sections 3(b) and 4(2). Note, however, 
that Regulation 15 does not permit Rule 
504 transactions to be exempted by co-
ordination. This distinction reflects the 
SEC's intention of using Rule 504 as way 
of deferring to state securities regula-
tion. 24 That is, the SEC defined in Rule 
504 a class of small offerings in which the 
federal interest would be de minimis, pro-
vided that the state securities administra-
tors would regulate those transactions. 
Accordingly, a Rule 504 transaction must 
either be registered by qualification in 
Maryland or be exempt from registration 
under another Maryland exemption, such 
as that provided by new Division of Se-
curities Regulation 9.25 
The Rest of the System: 
Maryland Regulation 9 
Context 
Regulation 15's exemption by coordi-
nation will be used for the great majority 
of limited offerings and private place-
ments, especially those made by larger 
corporate issuers and by limited partner-
ships offering tax-sheltered investments, 
since those transactions will typically be 
exempted under Rule 505 and 506. We 
have just seen, however, that Regulation 
15 cannot be used with a Rule 504 ex-
emption. Similarly, a transaction ex-
empted under the § 4(2) statutory ex-
emption, but not under the Rule 506 safe 
harbor, cannot be exempted by coordi-
nation. This is a significant distinction: 
many offerings by small businesses may 
be genuinely private in character, but may 
not qualify for a Rule 506 exemption be-
cause of a failure to comply with one of 
the highly specific conditions of that Rule, 
such as the notice filing requirement. Fur-
thermore, a transaction exempted under 
section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act because 
of its intra-state character would not be 
eligible for exemption by coordination. 26 
This is also a significant distinction, be-
cause a small business may be very local 
in character and may wish to take ad-
vantage of this exemption. 
Since all transactions exempted under 
Rule 504, § 4(2), or § 3(a)(11) should not 
be subject to registration, the drafters of 
the new Maryland rules attempted to de-
vise an exemption which would provide 
business, especially small business, with 
a simple, practicable financing tool, while 
still furnishing Maryland investors a sub-
stantial degree of investor protection. 
Regulation 9 is the product of that effort. 
Section 11-602(9), the statutory au-
thority for Regulation 9, is similar to § 3(b) 
of the 1933 Act, in that the exemption 
depends entirely on the Commissioner's 
exercise of his rule or order-making au-
thority. There is no automatic "statutory" 
§ 11-602(9) exemption; the exemption 
may be obtained only through compli-
ance with Regulation 9 or by order of the 
Commissioner. 
Regulation 9 has a structure similar to 
that of Regulation O. Section A provides 
definitions; section 8 defines conditions 
applicable to all transactions to be ex-
empted pursuant to Regulation 9; and 
sections C and 0 set out the exemptions 
themselves-the "Local Issuer" and 
"General Transactional" exemptions. 
Section E makes Regulation 9 inapplic-
able to federally registered transactions 
and to transactions federally exempted 
under Regulation A or Rules 505 and 506. 
A functional analysis of how the regu-
lation is intended to operate should begin 
with an examination of the General 
Transactional Exemption (the GTE), since 
that should be the most widely-used of 
the two Regulation 9 exemptions. 
The General Transactional Exemption 
The GTE exempts only specified se-
curities issued by corporations, partner-
ships (both limited and general) and real 
estate investment trusts (REITs). Sub-
section 0(1) limits the availability of the 
exemption to certain issuers and certain 
securities of those issuers in order to 
withhold the exemption from so-called 
"exotic" or unconventional securities in 
the form of investment contracts, since 
some of those securities have generated 
significant investor protection problems. 
The GTE is thus available as a matter of 
course to conventional equity and debt 
offerings by corporations, partnerships, 
and REITs. Subsection 0(1) permits the 
Securities Commissioner, however, to 
extend the GTE by order "to other types 
of securities and other types of issuers in 
any case in which he determines that to 
do so would not be inconsistent with the 
public interest." Accordingly, the issuer of 
a security not specifically included in sub-
section 0(1) may still be able to obtain 
the exemption upon application to the 
Commissioner. 
The GTE does not directly restrict the 
number or character of the persons to 
whom securities can be offered and the 
only indirect restriction on the number of 
offerees results from subsection 8(3)'s 
prohibition on general solicitation and ad-
vertising. The GTE does restrict, how-
ever, the number of purchasers. Sub-
section 0(2) provides that "[t)he issuer 
shall reasonably believe that there are no 
more than thirty-five purchasers, in this 
State, of securities from the issuer in any 
offering pursuant to this section." The 
number "thirty-five" should not be read 
literally, however, because subsection 8(6) 
excludes from the calculation of that fig-
ure certain related persons of the issuer, 
certain entities in which the issuer or its 
related persons have more than a 50 per-
cent beneficial interest, and accredited 
investors. 
The term "accredited investor" is de-
fined in subsection A(1); the definition is 
a liberalized version of Rule 501 (a) of 
Regulation O. Accordingly, "accredited 
investor" includes: certain institutional 
investors; directors, executive officers, and 
general partners of the issuer, together 
with related persons of such persons;27 
purchasers of at least $150,000 of the 
securities being offered, if the payment is 
made on certain specified terms and if 
the purchaser meets certain net worth cri-
teria; and purchasers with a net worth of 
at least $1 ,000,000, or an annual income 
of $200,000 in each of the two most re-
25 
cent years.2B 
Subsection 0(3) defines the issuer's 
disclosure obligations under the GTE. If 
the issuer sells only to accredited inves-
tors, no specific form of disclosure is 
mandated as a condition of the exemp-
tion. In other words, failure to provide a 
specific disclosure document will not re-
sult in loss of the GTE, although the anti-
fraud laws will still require accurate dis-
closure of all material information. 
Similarly, the GTE requires no specific 
form of disclosure when the issuer sells 
only to persons who meet certain invest-
ment sophistication criteria, or only to a 
combination of accredited and sophisti-
cated investors. Note that the concept of 
investment sophistication plays only a very 
limited role under Regulation 9. That is, 
the sophistication of the investors may be 
relevant to the form of disclosure, but the 
exemption itself does not depend upon 
offer and sale only to sophisticated inves-
tors. The old-fashioned "offeree suitabil-
ity" concept has thus been abandoned. 
Conversely, an issuer cannot obtain an 
exemption simply by selling only to so-
phisticated investors. The other condi-
tions must also be satisfied. 
If the issuer sells to one non-accredited 
or unsophisticated investor, it must pro-
vide a disclosure document to every 
investor. If the issuer is a corporation, it 
may use Form MO-2. Form MO-2 is a 
simplified, fill-in-the-blank disclosure form. 
While every issuer should rely on expe-
rienced counsel in completing Form MO-
2, the form is designed to help both the 
seller and the buyer understand the in-
formation being disclosed. It represents 
a major innovation and a departure from 
a tradition of securities regulation which 
mandates the production of repetitive, un-
readable and unread disclosures. Only 
time will tell whether the innovation is suc-
cessful, but it is intended to make the 
disclosure process more meaningful to 
both the investor and the entrepreneur. 
Form MO-2 requires specific informa-
tion about: the securities being offered; 
the use of the offering proceeds; the busi-
ness of the issuer; the risk factors as-
sociated with the business; the organi-
zational history of the issuer; the identity 
and remuneration of persons selling the 
securities; the identity and background of 
the managers and owners of the issuer; 
possible conflicts of interest; remunera-
tion of management; recent distributions 
by the issuer; recent securities issu-
ances; the terms of payment for the se-
curities being offered; the expiration date 
of the offering; prior issuance of securities 
to insiders at a price lower than the of-
fering price; and the terms of any escrow 
of the proceeds of the offering. In addition 
to the foregoing, Item 19 of Form MO-2 
requires the issuer, as a condition to the 
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exemption, to provide various forms of 
financial data. The amount and type of 
financial disclosure varies with the length 
of time the issuer has been in operation 
and with the availability of certified finan-
cial statements. 
As just mentioned, only corporations 
may use Form MD-2. Limited partner-
ships and other issuers are, for now, re-
quired to fashion a disclosure document 
which will provide equivalent information 
in an appropriate form.29 These docu-
ments need not track Form MD-2's "fill-
in-the-blank" format. The Division plans 
to publish a form for use by limited part-
nerships after a period of experimentation 
with Form MD-2. 
While the use of Form MD-2 or its 
equivalent is unnecessary when the is-
suer sells only to accredited or sophisti-
cated investors, another form of disclo-
sure to such investors is required 
whenever the issuer has previously is-
sued "cheap stock" (stock sold at a price 
substantially lower than the offering price) 
to the insiders or does not intend to es-
crow the entire proceeds of the offering. 
In essence, the issuer is required to spe-
cifically disclose to all investors the ex-
istence of such cheap stock or the lack 
of escrow. Part II of Form MD-2 can be 
used for that purpose. Subsection 
D(2)(b)(i) defines when issuance of se-
curities to insiders at a lower price trig-
gers this disclosure requirement. These 
special disclosure requirements reflect the 
risks to investors which sometimes arise 
when the proceeds of the offering can be 
used before the offering is completed, and 
when the insiders have paid less for their 
equity position than the outside investors. 
In addition to complying with subsec-
tion D(3)'s disclosure requirements, the 
issuer will have to make a simple notice 
filing with the Division of Securities on 
Form MD-1 if the aggregate offering price 
of the securities exceeds $100,000. This 
$100,000 limit thus applies to the amount 
of securities offered, not the amount ac-
tually sold. Subsection 8(7) requires this 
filing to be made no more than fifteen 
days after the first sale of securities pur-
suant to the GTE. 
The issuer must also exercise reason-
able care to ensure that the purchasers 
of securities offered under the GTE are 
purchasing for investment and not with a 
view to distribution of the securities. Sub-
section 8(5) lists several steps which the 
issuer can take to meet this duty of care, 
including placement of a restrictive leg-
end on the certificate or other document 
evidencing the securities. A suggested 
form of legend is set out in that subsec-
tion; it states that the securities have been 
issued pursuant to a claim of exemption 
from the federal and state securities laws, 
and that they cannot be resold without 
registration or another exemption. 
The issuer must also be wary of the 
"integration" requirement, i.e., it must be 
sure that all of the sales which are part 
of the GTE offering meet all the condi-
tions of the exemption (subsection 8(2». 
Finally, the issuer must reasonably be-
lieve that the persons remunerated for 
selling the securities meet the criteria of 
subsection 8(4). These are the same cri-
teria specified in Regulation 15 8(3). 
Even if the issuer fulfills all of the fore-
going conditions, however, it will be dis-
qualified from the exemption if it or certain 
associated persons have been subject to 
certain specified judicial and administra-
tive action. The "bad boy" provisions 
specified in subsection 8(9) are identical 
to those set out in Regulation 15 8(4). 
The Local Issuer Exemption 
While the GTE should prove to be a 
flexible financing device, the drafters of 
Regulation 9 wanted to ensure that an 
even more flexible device would be avail-
able to very small businesses-to "mom 
and pop". This kind of flexibility is espe-
cially important because § 11-602(9), as 
noted above, does not offer a separate 
statutory exemption on which the issuer 
could rely apart from the rule. 
The "Local Issuer Exemption" (the 
"LIE") thus allows some small, local cor-
porations to issue a limited amount of se-
curities to a limited number of investors 
with minimal regulatory interference. Under 
section C of Regulation 9, the LIE is avail-
able to corporations which: (1) are either 
incorporated or qualified to do business 
in Maryland; (2) have their principal place 
of business in Maryland; and (3) have 
fewer than fifty beneficial owners. Such 
"local issuers" may sell up to $100,000 
of securities to no more than ten pur-
chasers within a twelve-month period. 
Excluded from the calculation of the ten 
purchasers are the persons specified in 
subsection 8(6). The local issuer can use 
the LIE, moreover, without filing any kind 
of notice with the Division, and no specific 
form of disclosure is required as a con-
dition of the exemption. The antifraud laws, 
of course, will require accurate disclosure 
of all material information, but the ex-
emption does not depend on that disclo-
sure. 
The only other conditions are those 
general ones imposed by section 8: the 
general advertising and solicitation pro-
hibitions, the remuneration restrictions, 
the "bad boy" disqualifications, and the 
resale restrictions. The integration re-
quirement also applies to the LIE as well 
as the GTE. 
The LIE offers a very simple exemption 
for small businesses trying to raise a lim-
ited amount of capital. The array of ex-
emptions offered by the LIE, the GTE, 
and Regulation 15 should thus meet the 
financing needs of most Maryland is-
suers. The terms of these exemptions, 
however, are highly specific, and the pos-
sibility of unintentional non-compliance 
arises. Subsection 8(1 )(b) of Regulation 
9, therefore, provides that an issuer that 
fails to meet all the conditions of either 
the LIE or the GTE may apply for an ex-
empting order from the Securities Com-
missioner. The Commissioner may grant 
that order under subsection 8(1 )(b) if he 
finds that "the transaction demonstrates 
substantial compliance in good faith with 
the conditions of the regulation" and that 
"the order would not be inconsistent with 
the public interest." 
Some Cautionary Notes 
1. While this brief article may be of some 
help to the general business practitioner, 
it is no substitute for a careful examina-
tion of the rules themselves, since many 
crucial nuances must be omitted from an 
introductory survey. 
2. Although an issuer using the GTE 
or the LIE will not always have to provide 
the investors with a Form MD-2 as a con-
dition of the exemption, it should find use 
of the form helpful as a way of complying 
with the antifraud requirements. While use 
of the form does not in itself guarantee 
freedom from suit, its use may help the 
issuer avoid such litigation. The Division 
thus hopes that the availability of this clear 
and practical form will generate greater 
compliance with Maryland's securities 
laws. 
3. The practitioner should accustom 
small business clients to planning secu-
rities law compliance before commence-
ment of their capital-raising efforts. A be-
lated attempt to comply runs a greater 
risk of failure, and failure may mean sub-
stantialliability as well as the death of the 
deal. 
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I plan on living a long and healthy life, so I 
get regular cancer checkups. You should 
too. Contact your local ACS office for a free 
pamphlet on our new cancer checkup 
guideline. Because if you're like me, 
you want to live long enough to do it all. 
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